Mill's Higher and Lower Pleasures
>John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism (1861) is an extended explanation of utilitarian moral theory. In an effort to respond to criticisms of the doctrine, Mill not only argued in favour of the basic principles of utilitarianism as propounded by Jeremy Bentham, but also offered several significant modifications to its structure, meaning and application. One such modification is his distinction of "higher" and "lower" pleasures. Like Bentham, Mill believed that 'actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness' [1] , although unlike Bentham, who believed that all pleasures are measurable on a single scale, therefore when calculating the moral worth of an action (i.e. the amount of happiness it will promote) one need consider, among other things, the duration and intensity or quantity of the pleasure that will be consequent from the action., Mill believed that not only is the duration and intensity of a pleasure important, but also, perhaps most important of all is the very nature of the pleasure in question. In other words, pleasures should be assessed on qualitative as well as quantitative grounds. To quote his explanation in Utilitarianism, 'it is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others' [2] . In this paper, I firstly intend to provide a succinct evaluation of Mill's distinction of "higher" and "lower pleasures". I propose that Mill's distinction was not necessarily intended and need not be accepted as some definitive guide for composition of one's own qualitative pleasure hierarchy. Nor, if at all possible, would it be necessarily appropriate in each and every one of the innumerable morally significant decisions one will deliberate upon throughout their lifetime, to refer to such a static qualitative hierarchy when assessing the utilitarian validity of each action. Secondly, I shall inquire into some of the implications, particularly social, resulting from a general interpretation of Mill's utilitarianism.
So what does Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures suggest? When Mill introduces the notion of higher pleasures he is clearly discussing, among other things, intellectual pursuits and activities as well as pleasures of aesthetics and sympathy. An adequately satisfying human life must thus contain 'pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, which have a much higher value as pleasures than those of mere sensation' [3] . Arguing that pleasures of the intellect are of a higher nature whereas sensual pleasures or the 'animal appetites' are of a lower nature, Mill claims that it is 'better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied'. One simple yet convincing reason Mill provides to support his distinction of pleasures is that 'of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are � equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties' [4] . Mill also attributes the nobility of higher pleasures as accounting for their higher value and believes that 'competent judges' have a sense of dignity which has them prefer intellectual pleasures over sensual ones.
Mill's account of human happiness, although relative, may be quite accurate, although I feel that its implications are not as simple as to ascribe qualitative precedence to intellectual pleasures over sensual pleasures upon each and every occasion in which one must choose an action. Such an approach, though generally, may not necessarily always be the most appropriate calculation guide. Rather, I view the notion of intellectual pleasure, for those who do regard it more highly, as a profound essence of their being that they would not sacrifice in exchange for copious amounts of sensual pleasures. Permit me to offer a thought experiment so that I may better convey my view. One is a soul about to be allocated a life. They are offered either the choice of a great philosopher or that of a pig. The philosopher has a long, prolific career involving great success and enjoyment but the pig can only experience the most primitive sensual experiences possible, but its life will last a million years. Should one choose the apparently insatiable yet intellectually active life of a philosopher or the voluptuous life of an ancient pig? [5] In accordance with Millian utilitarianism, the choice to opt for would be that of the philosopher. Although the pig's life consists of far greater quantities of sensual pleasure, no amount of this lower pleasure, however prodigious, could compensate for one's existence devoid of inherent higher faculties and the ability to experience higher pleasures. Therefore, the total happiness one derives during their lifetime is not directly proportional to pleasure. When one considers the maximum possible happiness they can derive from their existence, elements other than pleasure quantity must be considered, that, 'fulfilled lives manifest (among other things) 'spiritual perfection' and self-respect, and the love of external objects like beauty, order and truth'. [6] In light of this perspective, it is plausible to bifurcate types of pleasure so that one may be guided in leading a life that generally promotes higher pleasures and assuages their higher faculties. Yet as I mentioned in the previous paragraph, this greater appreciation does not warrant a complete and total domination of higher pleasure prioritisation in all the decisions one will make through their lifetime.
Humans are both sentient and thinking beings. The desired lifestyle therefore I believe, is one that maintains a balance and satisfies both higher and lower pleasure faculties. Since the life which experiences both sensual and intellectual pleasures is the most fulfilling, we should attempt to maximize happiness by promoting actions that extract the most appropriate balance of pleasure, or for a given situation promote a particular pleasure that make an overall contribution to maintaining the desired balance. I will not elaborately expound upon any criterion for such a balance, though if in accordance with Millian utilitarianism, it should allow for sufficientpartiality towards maintaining a greater proportion of higher pleasure and a moderate, complementary proportion of lower pleasure so that the assuaging of sensual pleasures should not utterly hinder the general promotion of intellectual pursuits and activities. One should abstain from debauchery and not lead a life of monotonous overindulgence immersed within sensual pleasures, yet in acknowledgement of human sentience and its inherent fundamentality, it would be absurd to deprive person of sensual pleasures completely, claiming that only the intellectual pleasures, while grander in a sense, are worth pursuing in every instance; in fact the total privation of sensual pleasures for most people may indeed have a deleterious effect.
The importance or level of a pleasure therefore can be given complete consideration only in relevance to a particular situation. Even if one were intent on employing some sort of felicific calculus while assessing the utilitarian validity of each action involving higher and lower pleasures, would higher pleasures be allocated greater numerical value on a linear scale and this value incorporated into a calculation such as:
Happiness = quality � duration � intensity
Or would higher pleasures be considered infinitely greater, therefore the incorporation of infinite quality into such a calculation would result in a higher pleasure always outweighing a lower pleasure. According to my own view quality would generally be given a greater numerical value only insofar as its contribution to maintaining the desired balance discussed in the previous paragraph. According to Mill, with whom I am inclined to agree, when such a calculation is placed in perspective of one's entire lifetime, quality would implicitly be assigned an infinite value.
The choice a Mill-style utilitarian would have made in the thought experiment given earlier signifies an important effect on Mill's utilitarianism resulting from his distinction of higher and lower pleasures. 'Though Mill appears to want to defend hedonistic utilitarianism, his doctrine of "higher pleasures" seems anti-hedonistic' [7] . Hedonistic utilitarianism embraces the pure hedonistic tenet that the seeking of pleasure is the chief or proper aim in life, an end in itself; therefore, should pleasure really be distinguished into higher and lower categories? Should it not be enough to simply quantify resultant pleasures, so that in every instance in which an action will result in a greater proportion of sensual pleasures over intellectual pleasures and vice versa, that action should be carried out? Mill says no to this because he believed human well-being did not consist solely in the acquisition of pleasures regardless of their nature. Whether or not the following view of Mill's utilitarianism is accurate, I am not inclined to fully concur. 'Mill appears here to claim not just that these higher pleasures are more valuable than lower pleasures, but that their value is infinitely or perhaps lexically greater than that of lower pleasures, because he claims that no quantity of lower pleasures could ever outweigh the value of higher pleasures [8] (Italics mine). If one were to consider my previous two paragraphs I believe it complements my partial disagreement with this view. For it is understandable that in veneration and commitment to maintaining a conception of human happiness whose dominant component consists in the exercise of one's rational capacities, that despite its inferior quantity, the greater value of, hence preference for a higher pleasure may consist in its intellectually satiating superiority and commitment to that conception. Yet I italicised the relevant portion of this quote due to my view that conversely, in certain instances, it may be more appropriate to sacrifice a small amount of higher pleasure for a more beneficial dosage of lower pleasure to maintain a desired balance.
The hedonistic utilitarian that disagrees with Mill may claim that the intrinsic values of the pleasures within his ostensible pleasure hierarchy are in actual fact uniform. More so, lower pleasures require less expenditure of energy and are generally unaccompanied by tribulation. So why should one be so ardent in their preference for higher pleasures? Furthermore, 'Mill's statement of the higher pleasures doctrine refers to certain activities and pursuits, rather than the mental states in which they are constituents or the mental states that they cause [9] (Italics Mine), leading to accusations that he has adulterated his conception of happiness by basing a ranking of pleasures on extrinsic aspects also. I do not agree with the italicised portion of the previous quote for I believe that the higher pleasure doctrine does also refer to the mental states caused by certain activities and pursuits and in my view Mill has not adulterated his conception of happiness and remains a proponent of the 'greatest happiness principle', albeit in a more abstract manner. Mill's approach may not be as uncomplicated as that of the hedonistic utilitarian, yet even though he seems to attribute an anti-utilitarian importance to activities and pursuits in utilitarian decision making, this is because one's participation in higher activities and pursuits, and the immense satisfaction accompanying such participation in their knowledge that doing so contributed to maintaining a dominant intellectual component in their life, results in the greater happiness, not due to pleasure quantity, but due to pleasure profundity, for the hedonistic utilitarian approach will not suffice for the dissatisfied Socrates, who has 'faculties more exalted than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them does not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification [10]
It seems that utilitarianism in general, is relatively straightforward when one considers individual happiness. One is inclined when the resultant pleasures of their action solely concern their own happiness, to aim for the greatest happiness possible. Yet, when one has to carry out actions and consider their effects on societal happiness, choices become more intricate, resultant pleasures become more difficult to measure and calculate. The inclusion of qualitative measurements of resultant happiness adds a considerable element of possible confusion to this already difficult decision process. A prime difficulty arises due to the fact that people's conception of pleasure quality and the nature of happiness differ, as I shall elaborate.
Firstly, as discussed earlier, I believe that Mill's distinction of pleasures should primarily, and perhaps only, be accepted as a bifurcation of higher and lower pleasures intended to provide general guidance for decision making that promotes an existence whose dominant component consists in the exercise of one's rational capacities. It is not some qualitative scale of pleasures that one may refer to in each and every occasion when confronted with a decision to make. There may be an appropriate distinction between higher and lower pleasures to regulate the desired existence, though I do not believe both types of pleasure, particularly higher, when compared to pleasures within their own respective categories, are commensurable. If so, how would it be possible to measure pleasures in the required sense on some sort of linear scale? How do you compare the pleasure one gets from playing a musical instrument, the enthrallment one feels on contemplating the starry sky, and the interest one finds in reading a fantasy novel or the enjoyment one finds in writing poetry? For the individual, contemplation of their own happiness is a manageable assessment, though in contemplating the resultant happiness in a situation involving other people, decision-making becomes virtually impossible and prone to subjectivity. For example, I may not care much for writing poetry, though I may thoroughly enjoy playing the piano. If I were to have to choose an action resulting in the maximum happiness for a given situation, where the consequence of my action involved either one person spending some time writing poetry or another person practicing on their piano for an equal amount of time, it is most probable that I would be inclined to give greater weight to the pleasure of the piano player, though objectively (whatever that means), the poet may have derived a greater degree of happiness if my action had served his interests. So it may seem only fair in such a situation to measure pleasure quantitatively.
A second problem to contend with for the Mill-style utilitarian is the division within a society of those who would generally tend to adhere to the hedonistic utilitarian creed and those who would generally tend to adhere to the Millian utilitarian creed. If one is reading Mill, it is quite probable by the very fact that they are immersed within an intellectually exercising text that they are going to fall into that class of utilitarianism which Mill advocates. Though n [11] ot all are as such, and regardless of Mill's judgmental statement 'if the fool, �is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question', these "fools" may still be members of the society, and a posed conundrum is how may a Mill-style utilitarianism deal with this variation, in an attempt to apply social utility and maximize societal happiness? In the tradition of utilitarian humanitarianism, morality and the 'greatest good for the greatest number' tenet, the Mill-style utilitarian, although justifiably and appropriately an advocate of higher pleasures wherever possible, must find a compromise with hedonistic utilitarianism at times. If 'the greatest good for the greatest number' axiom of utilitarian reasoning is to be adhered to, then the Mill-style utilitarian must acknowledge that in a given circumstance, if those in question are incapable of properly experiencing the higher pleasure, there may be greater benefit in selection of the lower pleasure, as the people involved are more inclined to derive a greater degree of happiness from the lower pleasure. This notion of higher and lower pleasures interpreted alternatively may also conflict with another aspect of utilitarianism; that all people are, ethically speaking, equal, in all situations. One person's happiness is precisely important as another's. Though if one could prioritise the higher pleasure one could experience over the lower pleasure several people could experience on the basis of extrinsic or abstractly intrinsic superiority, then this may perhaps warrant such prioritisation though it would definitely seem anti-utilitarian and undoubtedly create an ethical quagmire.
References
[1] Mill, J.S, Utilitarianism (London: Penguin, 1987 [first pub. 1863]), p.278.
[2] Ibid, p.279
[3] Ibid, p.279.
[4] Ibid, p.280.
[5] Thought experiment adapted from an example given in (Crisp, Roger, �Editors Introduction� in J.S. Mill Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.10).
[6] Scarre, Geoffrey, John Stuart Mill (Routledge 1996), p.94.
[7] Brink, David, "Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism" in David Lyons, Ed, Mill's Utilitarianism (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littleman Publishers, 1997), p.149.
[8] Ibid., p.153.
[9] Ibid., p.153.
[10] Mill, Utilitarianism, p.279.
[11] Ibid., p.281.